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Abstract
Background: Publicly funded healthcare forms an intricate part of government spending in most Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, because of its reliance on entitlements and dedicated
revenue streams. The impact of budgetary rules and procedures on publicly funded health care might thus be
different from other spending categories. In this study we focus on the potential of fiscal rules to contain these
costs and their design features.
Methods: We assess the relationship between fiscal rules and the level of public health care expenditure of
32 (OECD) countries between 1985 and 2014. Our dataset consists of health care expenditure data of the
OECD and data on fiscal rules of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for that same period. Through a
multivariate regression analysis, we estimate the association between fiscal rules and its subcategories and
inflation adjusted public health care expenditure. We control for population, Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
debt and whether countries received an IMF bailout for the specific period. In all our regressions we include
country and year fixed effects.
Results: The presence of a fiscal rule on average is associated with a 3 % reduction of public health care
expenditure. Supranational balanced budget rules are associated with some 8 % lower expenditure. Health
service provision-oriented countries with more passive purchasing structures seem less capable of containing
costs through fiscal rules. Fiscal rules demonstrate lagged effectiveness; the potential for expenditure reduction
increases after one and two years of fiscal rule implementation. Finally, we find evidence that fiscal frameworks
that incorporate multi-year expenditure ceilings show additional potential for cost control.
Conclusions: Our study shows that there seems a clear relationship between the potential of fiscal rules and
budgeting health expenses. Using fiscal rules to contain the level of health care expenditure can thus be a
necessary precondition for successful strategies for cost control.
Keywords: Health budgeting, Fiscal rules, Budgetary governance, OECD
Background
There have been widespread efforts to identify the
main drivers behind the growth of health care
expenditure [1–4], as identifying these drivers allows
policy makers to develop (effective) measures to con-
tain health care costs. Important determinants in
these studies include demographic changes such as
ageing societies, income and price developments and
the spread of medical technologies. The relation be-
tween health expenditure and the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) is most prominent throughout the lit-
erature, as it captures many underlying economic and
societal developments. Institutional and regulatory de-
terminants such as the level of debt cautiously point
to an inverse relationship; as debt levels rise, public
health care expenditure seems to decline [1].
Policy measures that target the drivers of health
expenditure growth have been much debated over the
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past decades. Much less prolific has been the litera-
ture on the impact of budgetary governance, or the
use of fiscal rules in particular, on offsetting the rise
of health care costs for the medium to long-term.
Over the past decade, governments of Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries have increasingly devised fiscal frameworks
to contain government spending [5]. Yet few studies
examine the effectiveness of fiscal frameworks for
such public health care expenditure. Reeves et al. [6]
point out that health sectors are not protected during
periods of austerity, thereby suggesting that fiscal
frameworks might be successful in containing health
budgets. It is thus of interest to study the potential of
fiscal rules to contain publicly funded health care,
and its design features.
Throughout the OECD, public health expenses form
an intricate part of government spending. On the one
hand they highly correlate with economic growth.
This is illustrated by the notable slowdown of health
expenditure in the aftermath of the economic and fi-
nancial crisis of 2008. On the other hand, cutting
back on health entitlements or provisions is often
politically fraught and unpopular amongst politicians,
propelling them towards cutbacks in other areas,
such as discretionary non-health spending [7]. There
are both exogenous and health care specific circum-
stances that impact expenditure development, which
are not present in most other public spending
categories.
It is thus of interest, to study the fiscal rules that
govern the decision making process on health ex-
penditure and to ascertain what their influence has
been on the level of publicly funded health budgets
in recent decades. To this end, we compare expend-
iture data of publicly funded health care of 32 OECD
countries between 1985 and 2014, with a dataset on
fiscal rules in those countries by the IMF for that
same period. Our analysis covers changes in budget
policies from year to year and the results thus pro-
vide a comparison between different countries and
within a single country.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) defines a
fiscal rule as a rule that imposes a long-lasting
constraint on fiscal policy through numerical limits
on budgetary aggregates [5]. A considerable body of
literature in the field of public finance discusses the
relationship between fiscal rules and fiscal perform-
ance. Its main findings are that ‘tighter and more
encompassing rules are correlated with stronger cyc-
lically adjusted primary balances in EU countries, that
balanced budget rules and debt rules have a greater
impact on budgetary outcomes than expenditure rules
and revenue rules, and that rules that cover wider
levels of government are associated with stronger fis-
cal discipline’ [5].
The IMF identifies four categories of fiscal rules:
expenditure rules (ER), revenue rules (RR), debt rules
(DR) and balanced budget rules (BBR).1 Our focus is
on ERs and BBRs, because they impact expenditure
levels more directly than the other two. For BBRs we
make a distinction between national and supra-
national rules and countries that operate both in
tandem. The latter is particularly relevant for EU
countries, as BBRs are part of the budgetary frame-
work of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.
We assess if fiscal rules have a more limited impact
on countries that are health service provision-oriented
(passive purchasing that limits countervailing powers
towards providers) and rely on social insurance con-
tributions that underline the entitlement character of
health care services [24]. We hypothesize that such
systems are less impacted by fiscal policy. Because
cost-control policies in healthcare take time to
implement, we are additionally interested if rules
become more effective one and two years after
implementation of such a rule. In addition to the
direct effect of fiscal rules, we look at the impact of
enforcement and monitoring mechanisms that often
accompany them, since evidence suggests that
expanding fiscal rules with these mechanisms in-
creases their effectiveness.
Fiscal rules aim to depoliticize policymaking. By re-
moving discretionary intervention, they seek to achieve
predictability of government action [8]. Over the past
decades, fiscal rules have been relatively successful in
containing government expenditure [9, 10]. Guichard et
al. [11] find that fiscal rules with embedded expenditure
targets have been associated with larger fiscal consoli-
dations. At the same time, the impact of fiscal rules
seems context dependent. Dahan and Strawczynski [12]
for example find a negative effect of fiscal rules on the
ratio of social transfers to government consumption. In
general, the authors point out, government consump-
tion seems more resistant to the pressures of fiscal
rules than social transfers. If however, a country shows
a strong legal commitment for a social safety net, this
effect disappears. They draw the conclusion that gov-
ernments, when designing fiscal policies, should take
into account the effect of fiscal rules on spending
composition.
The potential impact of fiscal rules on government
spending seems well established. So what are import-
ant design features of fiscal rules? Most scholars agree
that the existence of rules is no guarantee in itself for
fiscal prudence. In order for rules to be successful,
they have to be well designed and there has to be pol-
itical willingness to comply [13–15]. This willingness
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can be codified at various institutional levels: legal
bases for fiscal rules can vary from constitutional, to
statutory, and coalition or political agreement. With
some caution, evidence shows that a strong legal basis
and strict enforcement seem to have had a beneficial
impact on fiscal performance in the past decades
throughout the OECD [5]. The exact interaction be-
tween fiscal discipline and fiscal rules is however com-
plicated, since countries with strong fiscal discipline
do not necessarily dispose of fiscal rules, and countries
with such rules that do not observe or renew them do
not necessarily demonstrate fiscal discipline [16]. This
links to possible omitted variable bias: the correlation
between strong fiscal performance and the use of fiscal
rules may in fact be the result of political commitment
rather than the existence of a rule.
Schick [17] points to the importance of a budget hori-
zon of several years. He argues that the annual budget
process is ‘an invitation to evasion’. By introducing a
budget horizon that covers several budget years the pro-
pensity to hold off difficult policy measures is limited,
since governments are compelled to bring their policies
in line with the fiscal rule [5].
Another important element seems to ‘empower
independent overseers to review budget actions and
to point out actual or potential violations’ [17]. In
addition, independent bodies that both set budget
assumptions and monitor the implementation of
budgetary measures potentially strengthen the fiscal
framework. These activities are often performed by
economic scoring agencies or independent fiscal bod-
ies that are increasingly active throughout the OECD
[8]. Debrun and Kumar [15] provide some evidence
that these institutions contribute to budgetary out-
comes, although they do also point to the possibility
of reverse causality, in which countries ‘lock in’
already existing fiscal consolidation preferences.
The literature on the association between fiscal
policy and health care expenditure is limited. Most
contributions focus on how budgetary governance
structures impact decisions on health. White [18] for
example discusses how budget professionals and
health policy makers collide in respect to the health
budget. He argues that the former often have the
upper hand, concluding that political forces are in
the end stronger than the budget or health profes-
sionals. This observation is shared by Schakel et al.
[19], who provide a qualitative analysis of the actual
use of fiscal rules in the Netherlands and the United
States. Their conclusion is that fiscal rules seem to
have more bearing on budgetary outcomes than on
the budget process itself, in other words: the num-
bers prevail the compliance with the budgetary
process.
An empirical study of the cost cutting potential of
fiscal rules in respect to public health expenditure
seems relevant for a number of reasons. First, the
health budget of OECD countries has risen faster
over the past decades than other spending categories
and GDP [7]. It thus seems of interest to study what
the impact of fiscal rules has been on expenditure
development. Second, as we have seen above, the ef-
fectiveness of fiscal rules as a depoliticized policy
framework is under debate. This may be even more
so in the case of the health budget: health care is
often seen as a ‘right’ and is labeled as ‘high priority’
by citizens. Thirdly, controlling the health budget
requires effective coordination between many stake-
holders which often creates time lags and informa-
tion shortages. Steering costs effectively using fiscal
rules therefore seems challenging.
Methods
Data
We gather data on health expenditure of 32 OECD
countries between 1985 and 2014 from the OECD
health statistics database [20]. OECD member coun-
tries Turkey and Korea are not included in this
analysis, due to a lack of IMF data on fiscal rules
for these countries. Of these 32 countries, 21 are
part of the European Union and thus subject to the
‘corrective arm’ as part of the Stability and Growth
Pact (SGP) of the EU.2 This means that for these
countries, a supranational balanced budget rule has
been in place since the introduction of the SGP
(1992), or as soon as a country became a member of
the Union.
From the database we derive the annual nominal ex-
penditure figures in international dollar terms, which we
adjust for purchasing power parity that is based on year
2005.
Next, we search the IMF database on fiscal rules
for the same period [21]. The database includes
about 70 variables on fiscal rules and comprises
quantitative and qualitative information on various
characteristics, such as the number and type of
rules, legal basis, coverage, escape clauses, enforce-
ment, and supporting procedures. The dataset is
not specifically catered towards the health budget.
For this reason, we correct our dataset for those
countries that have excluded health expenditure
from their general fiscal framework for a given
period, which in our timeframe, include Austria,
Switzerland and the United States. Table 1 in
Appendix 2 provides an overview of the active fiscal
rules of our 32-country sample between 1985 and
2014.
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Estimating the effect of fiscal rules on public health care
expenditure
The aim of this study is to estimate the following
equation:
Expenditurei;t ¼ β0 þ β1FRi;t þ Xi;tγ þ α1
X
countryi þ α2
X
yeart þ ϵi;t
ð1Þ
Our primary independent variable of interest, fiscal
rules (FR), is presented as a dummy variable. We study
the overall presence of a fiscal rule and further discrim-
inate between expenditure rules and balance budget
rules since those seem most relevant for the direct steer-
ing of health expenses.
The dependent variable expenditurei, t measures the
inflation adjusted public health care expenditure of
country i in year t. Xi, t represents a vector of control
variables, which includes several demographic and
economic characteristics. In particular, we use four
control variables. First, GDP, which serves as a proxy
for both income and price development. Some na-
tional longitudinal studies suggest an income elasticity
slightly greater than one, indicating that income and
health expenditure are highly correlated [3]. Second,
we use debt to indicate the level of public debt, as gov-
ernments with higher debts are more susceptible to
cutting back on the budget, including on health enti-
tlements and provisions. Third, the overall popula-
tion.3 Fourth, a dummy variable for which an IMF
bailout loan was received in country i during year t.
The IMF coerces grantees to implement structural
reforms to address institutional or economic weak-
nesses, in addition to policies that maintain macroeco-
nomic stability. All control variables are explained at
greater details in Appendix 1.
Finally, because of the non-random assignment of
the fiscal rules and the large variances in both the ex-
ternal environment (such as the impact of the global
economy), as well as the internal characteristics (such
as country-specific attitudes towards health care con-
sumption) that may not have been captured in the
current model, we add country and year fixed effects
in all our regressions.
It is generally assumed that health systems that rely
on entitlements and dedicated revenue streams face
greater budgetary challenges [7, 18, 22, 23]. For this
reason we run a separate regression that excludes five
countries whose health entitlements are based on
Table 1 The association between fiscal rules and the level of public health care expenditure
Public health care expenditure in log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
32 OECD countries Exclude Cluster I countries
FR −0.03** − 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01)
ER −0.04** −0.05***
(0.01) (0.01)
BBR −0.04** −0.05***
(0.01) (0.01)
BBR (detailed levels)
National −0.02
(0.02)
Supranational −0.06***
(0.02)
Both −0.08***
(0.02)
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 717 717 717 717 609 609 609
adj. R2 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997
Columns 1 to 4 include all countries in the dataset, and column 5 to 7 exclude cluster I countries. Dependent variable public health care expenditure is adjusted
for inflation and purchasing power. Appendix 3 provides a full table, including all control variables
Standard errors are in parentheses
**p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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contributions, and share other features such as a high
share of public funding as a percentage of total health
expenditure and low levels of regulation as well as
passive purchasing structures [24]. This cluster is
composed of Austria, Belgium, Germany, France and
Luxemburg4 (‘Cluster I countries’). Other features that
set these countries apart from other categories, is a
high level of autonomy of self-employed doctors and
a high level of freedom of consumer choice. Cluster
II and Cluster III countries (Great Britain, Sweden,
Portugal, among others) on the other hand have more
control over access to medical care and the salaries
of GPs and specialists. There is thus reason to as-
sume that ‘Cluster I countries’ have fewer levers to
control costs, and therefore might be less impacted
by fiscal rules.
Possible lagged effectiveness of fiscal rules
It is possible that the cost cutting potential of fiscal
rules increases when a time lag is introduced. There
are two main reasons to assume this effect is present.
First, a lag in reporting on health expenditure and a
subsequent delay in the implementation of contain-
ment measures is widely observed throughout the
OECD.5 The OECD suggests that this delay is often
due to data-collection issues or reporting from health
care institutions/insurers or sub-national governments.
It additionally notes that: ‘delays in information made
it harder for them [budget officials] to work with
Health Ministries to take corrective measures through
the year and in some cases prompt additional savings
within a short time frame to meet end-of-year fiscal
objectives’ [7]. The second reason is that modifica-
tions to the benefit basket or the level of out-of-
pocket costs in the current year, two strategies that
are often sought for by policymakers, are difficult to
attain. Under these circumstances, introducing such
modifications in year t will not lead to immediate cut
backs on the budget, but at the earliest in year t + 1.
We therefore introduce a two-tailed one- or two-year
time lag: both lagged implementation and persisting
effectiveness (after a rule has been suspended) in one
or two years.
We re-write Eq. (1) for such time lag in Eq. (2):
Expenditurei;t ¼ β0 þ β1FRi;t−k þ Xi;tγ þ α1
X
countryi þ α2
X
yeart þ ϵi;t
ð2Þ
Where k represents the number of years, which subse-
quently equals to 1 or 2.
The impact of further supporting procedures
Enforcement and monitoring mechanisms in theory
provide additional safeguards that fiscal rules will be
complied with. According to Budina et al. [5], these
features popularized throughout advanced and emer-
ging economies since the onset of the financial crisis
of 2008. The database provides a subset of data that
describe several of these supporting procedures. We
incorporate such variables as Eq. (3):
Expenditurei;t ¼ β0 þ β1FRi;t þ β2FRi;t  supportingproceduresi;t
þβ3supportingi;t þ Xi;tγ þ α1
X
countryi
þα2
X
yeart þ ϵi;t
ð3Þ
Supporting_procedures represents one of the following
variables in each of our models: 1) the legal basis of a
fiscal rule (level 1 = political commitment or coalition
agreement, level 2 = statutory or constitutional), 2)
the existence of multi-year expenditure ceilings, 3)
an independent body that sets budgetary assump-
tions and 4) an independent body monitoring
budget implementation. The coefficient β2 indicates
the additional effect of a particular supporting pro-
cedure on health care expenditure. It is important
to note that the IMF database is constructed in
such a way that for some of these supporting proce-
dures, they only exist when a fiscal rule is present,
which is why in our results, β3 in some models
were not estimated.
Results
Figure 1 provides an overview of the per capita average
public health care spending between 1985 and 2014. In
Appendix 1 we provide a more detailed explanation of
what constitutes OECD’s definition of public health care
expenditure.
The effects of fiscal rules on public health care
expenditure
Table 1 provides an overview of the association between
fiscal rules and the level of public health care expend-
iture, for both the 32 OECD countries and excluding the
‘Cluster I countries’.
The presence of a FR on average is associated
with 3% decrease in health care expenditure at a 1%
alpha level. Broken down by types of rules, ER
demonstrates a greater potential for expenditure re-
duction at 4%. Overall, countries with a BBR on
average devote 4% less of their public resources to
health care. However, its influence deserves further
elaboration: a national level BBR reveals a statisti-
cally insignificant negative relationship with health
care expenditure; yet, when this is adopted at a
supranational level, or at both levels combined, the
effect becomes considerably significant, at 6 and 8%
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respectively. This suggests that for EU countries, ef-
forts by the European Commission to enforce a 3%
maximum deficit seem to have a significant effect on
health expenses, one of the largest outlays within the
central budget. This effect might become even stron-
ger as a result of the increasing attention of health
reforms within the framework of the European Se-
mester process [25].
When excluding ‘Cluster I countries’ from the re-
gression, we find that coefficients of FR, ER and BBR
increase by one percentage point, respectively. This
suggests that countries that are health services
provision-oriented, seem indeed less capable of con-
trolling public health care expenditure through fiscal
rules, than other countries.
Figure 2 presents publicly funded health care
expenditure as percentage of GDP, pooled by country-
years with and without fiscal rules. It indicates that
on average, budgetary frameworks that incorporate
fiscal rules show lower health care expenditure
growth. Especially after the financial crisis of 2008,
stricter budgetary frameworks are associated with
lower expenditure growth. Although the figure does
not control for variables that are included in the
model, it does suggest that over time, governments
do benefit from stricter budgetary frameworks. The
figure might suggest that the regression coefficient we
find in our main model is underestimated; the cost
cutting potential of fiscal rules, especially in post cri-
sis years, seems considerable. In fact, in column 1 of
Fig. 2 Publicly funded health care expenditure (as % GDP) OECD 32 pooled by presence of a fiscal rule**
Fig. 1 Per Capita Public Health Care Expenditure OECD 32 Average 1985–2014*. *Source: Adapted from OECD 2016 (Per capita, constant prices,
constant PPPs, OECD base year)
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Appendix 6, in which we replaced the outcome vari-
able with public healthcare expenditure as a percent-
age of GDP, we see the presence of FRs is associated
with − 40% decrease in the outcome. It suggests that
countries with relative higher shares of health care
spending seem more successful in exerting fiscal pres-
sure than countries with lower shares of spending. A
sensitivity analysis, in which we replace some key variables
of our main model (columns 2–4 of Appendix 6),
however confirms the robustness of our initial find-
ings and the coefficient of our independent variable
of interest.
The possible lagged effect of fiscal rules on public health
care expenditure
Table 2 highlights the lagged effectiveness of fiscal
rules. The association between overall FR and ER and
the health budget increases by one percentage point
for each additional year after a government starts im-
plementation. At the same time, we find no such ef-
fects with BBR. All of the models described above
yield statistical significance on our primary independ-
ent variable of interest. These findings suggest that
the cost cutting potential of fiscal rules becomes
greater after one and two years.
The additional effects of supporting procedures
The results in Table 3 suggest that adopting supporting
procedures has to some extent an additional limiting ef-
fect on public health care expenditure, even though the
magnitude of such effects is mixed.
As columns 3–5 suggest, of all the studied enforce-
ment and monitoring mechanisms, the existence of a
fiscal rule in combination with a strict multi-year ex-
penditure ceiling shows the most promise in terms of
cost containment, at approximately 7% reduction. The
presence of an independent body setting budgetary
assumptions or an independent body monitoring
budget implementation yields no additional effect at
statistical significant levels. The coefficients of each
interaction terms and the primary independent vari-
able of interest are jointly significant. However, as
such enforcement and monitoring procedures are
closely correlated with the presence of a fiscal rule,
the true magnitude of their impacts is worth further
investigation.
The distinction between different levels of legal
frameworks for public health care expenditure seems
relevant. An ER supported by a legal framework has
a limiting effect on the level of public health expend-
iture. Interestingly, political frameworks (legal basis
level 1) are much more effective than those that are
enforced by legal rules (statutory or constitutional).
For both ERs and BBRs, it seems that political
frameworks correlate with lower levels of expenditure
than ones that are enshrined in statutes or the con-
stitution. Especially, expenditure rules that are under-
written by political goals seem effective versus other
frameworks.
Discussion
The main goal of this paper is to establish whether
governments that use fiscal rules – on average and
ceteris paribus – are better equipped to contain
health care expenditure than governments without
such rules. However, given that the level of spend-
ing dedicated to health care ultimately reflects a
political choice, it is also conceivable that some
countries willingly devote a larger share of resources
to health care than other countries do, while at the
same time complying with existing rules and fiscal
frameworks. Our analysis does not reveal this rela-
tionship – which should be an analysis with budget-
ary overruns as the dependent variable – but
instead describes the potential of fiscal rules in rela-
tion to budgeting health expenses. This study shows
that such a potential seems clearly present. The cost
cutting potential of fiscal rules still seems relatively
modest and compares to the association between a
country’s debt and that same budget (see Appendix 3
for details). On average, the association between
having a fiscal rule in place and the per capita de-
crease in health spending translates to roughly $
100.-. In line with the literature on the determinants
Table 2 The lagged effectiveness of fiscal rules
Public health care expenditure in log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
One year lag Two year lag
FR −0.04*** −0.05***
(0.01) (0.01)
ER −0.05*** −0.06***
(0.01) (0.01)
BBR −0.04*** −0.05***
(0.01) (0.01)
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 717 717 717 717 717 717
adj. R2 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997
Columns 1 to 3 show effects with one year lag, and columns 4 to 6 show
effects with two year lag. Dependent variable public health care expenditure is
adjusted for inflation and purchasing power. Appendix 4 provides a full table,
including all control variables. Standard errors are in parentheses
***p < 0.001
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of the growth of health expenditure, GDP explains
most of its variance. The relation between the rela-
tive share of publicly funded health care and the
cost cutting potential of fiscal rules seems present.
Further research in this area could potentially
demonstrate at what cutoff fiscal pressures are most
effective.
In a substantial number of OECD countries health
care is a sub-central responsibility, while sub-central
fiscal policy is commonly an integral part of general
government fiscal policy. Some evidence suggests
that widespread decentralization of health systems
has often increased health spending over the past
decades [26]. Sub-central fiscal policies mostly focus
on borrowing and debt rules, and less on expend-
iture. Moreover it seems that sub-central fiscal pol-
icies are often redundant due to the high level of
discretion of the general government in addressing
sub-central fiscal challenges [27]. For this reason,
we do not expand on the role sub-central govern-
ments play in controlling health budgets. We
hypothesize that sub-central decision making on
public health expenditure will align with fiscal rules
that govern the decision making of the general
government.
Much of our results are in line with the more
qualitative body of evidence that exists on budgeting
for health emanating from OECD surveys, country
studies and international comparisons. A quantitative
multi-level study by Getzen [28] shows that at the
highest levels of decision-making, budget constraints
are determinative for the amount of resources allo-
cated, rather than “the amount of disease”. Our re-
sults seem to align with these findings.
One area of future research could be to examine
the association between fiscal rules and various
health care utilization categories. A similar regres-
sion with average length of stay in a curative care
facility as the dependent variable shows a positive
correlation with having a fiscal rule in place (see
Appendix 7). This suggests that budgetary restric-
tions do not result in shorter hospital admissions,
which could in turn point to net efficiency gains. A
next step would be to determine if these efficiency
gains translate into lower prices or volumes of
care.
Our results further suggest that budgetary govern-
ance for health has been most successful within the
fiscal framework of the European Union. We cannot
ascertain the extent to which supranational BBRs
Table 3 The additional impact on health care expenditure from supporting procedures
Public health care expenditure in log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ER BBR FR
FR 0.09 −0.03* −0.02 −0.03** −0.03*
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
FR×FR legal basis Level 1 −0.17*** − 0.06***
(0.04) (0.02)
Level 2 0.17 0.04*
(0.10) (0.02)
FR × budget ceiling −0.05***
(0.01)
FR × independent body setting 0.01
(0.02)
FR × independent monitoring 0.06
(0.06)
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
N 717 717 717 717 717
adj. R2 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997
Independent variable FR is presented in different forms. In columns 1 and 2, it is presented as ER and BBR, respectively, where legal basis level 1 indicates either a
political commitment or coalition agreement, level 2 indicates either a statutory and constitutional level enforcement. In columns 3 to 5, it is presented as
aggregate FR. Appendix 5 provides a full table, including all control variables. Standard errors are in parentheses
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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have enforced structural health reforms or simply
enabled budget cuts. Greer et al. [29] find that, spe-
cific for the EU, ‘generic calls for reorganization are
having less effect than cruder, more direct policies to
reduce expenditure such as reduction in access,
reduction in pay, or less expenditure’. Irrespective of
the longer-term impact of fiscal policy, we can cau-
tiously draw the conclusion that Supranational Bal-
anced Budget Rules have shown substantial potential
for cost containment of health budgets.
Another finding is that the specific design features
of health systems seem to correlate with the suscepti-
bility of fiscal pressures. Although this may seem
intuitive, it seems of interest to acknowledge the inter-
action between fiscal policy and health systems design.
Largely decentralized systems (such as Switzerland or
Italy) are in many ways different from more central-
ized health systems [30, 31]. The same goes for health
systems that operate as bureaus (such as the United
Kingdom) compared to those that run entitlement
programs (such as the Netherlands). These health sys-
tems each face different challenges in terms of fiscal
sustainability and viable enforcement mechanisms and op-
erate distinct budgetary control procedures [22, 23, 32].
The impact of health systems on health expenses is dis-
cussed extensively in the literature [33, 34], although clear
relations are difficult to find [35]. When excluding ‘Cluster
I countries’ from the regression, we have seen that the cost
cutting potential of fiscal rules increases. It could be that
the FRs within ‘Cluster I countries’ apply less stringent
fiscal policies with regards to overspending. In any case,
interactions between health systems design and fiscal
frameworks seem to exist. Further research on this spe-
cific interaction seems warranted.
Conclusions
Our results can be seen as a call for attention to
budgetary governance, which turns out to be a crit-
ical feature in studying the success of different
systems in terms of fiscal performance, and the as-
sessment of preconditions that determine such suc-
cess. A recent OECD study aims to explain the
drivers of public health expenditure by assessing
policy and institutional variables [36]. The main
finding is that policy and institutional variables ex-
plain some 23% of public health expenditures. Our
study supports such findings with respect to fiscal
institutions.
The association between fiscal rules and a decrease
of the health budget becomes stronger one and two
years after implementation. This provides note-
worthy policy implications. Budget (preparation) cy-
cles are generally on an annual basis, while our
results suggest that budgetary recoups often cannot
easily take place within this short timeframe. It
seems crucial for policy makers and budget officials
to acknowledge these parallel realities and model
their budgetary frameworks accordingly. Thus it is
not very surprising that multi-year expenditure ceil-
ings further enhance the possible impact of fiscal
rules.
Finally, we find that the shape of the legal frame-
works additionally impacts the potential to limit the
health budget; politically constructed frameworks
are more strongly associated with lower levels of
health expenditures than rules that are confined in
legislation. This finding requires further investiga-
tion but might align with Schick’s statement that a
rule is as strong as the underlying political will to
enforce it.
Endnotes
1ERs set limits on total, primary, or current spend-
ing; RRs set ceilings or floors on revenues and are
aimed at boosting revenue collection and/or prevent-
ing an excessive tax burden; DRs set an explicit limit
or target for public debt in percent of GDP; BBRs
constrain the variable that primarily influences the
debt ratio and are largely under the control of policy
makers. (source: Budina et al. [5]).
2In the ‘corrective arm’ of the SGP, the Excessive
Deficit Procedure (EDP) ensures the correction of ex-
cessive budget deficits or excessive public debt levels.
It is a step-by-step approach for reining in excessive
deficits and reducing excessive debts. The EU Treaty
defines an excessive budget deficit as one greater than
3% of GDP. Public debt is considered excessive under
the Treaty if it exceeds 60% of GDP without dimin-
ishing at an adequate rate (defined as a decrease of
the excess debt by 5% per year on average over three
years) (source: ec.europa.eu)
3Government healthcare expenditure, GDP, debt and
population are expressed in natural log so that we are
able to interpret the results in percentage change.
Expenditure, GDP and debt are also measured in
international dollars (i.e. purchasing power parity) so
that we are able to compare different countries across
time.
4It should be noted that the analysis of Wendt only
includes fifteen European countries and that some
countries are characterized as social insurance sys-
tems (such as the Netherlands), but do not fit
Wendt’s typology.
5A delay in reporting of 6 months up to two years
is not uncommon throughout the OECD (see for an
overview of reporting delays per country OECD
2015, 92).
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Table 4 Description of variables
Variable Definition Data Source
Public Health Care
Expenditure
Health expenditure incurred by public funds. Public funds are state, regional and local
Government bodies and social security schemes. Public capital formation on health
includes publicly financed investment in health facilities plus capital transfers to the
private sector for hospital construction and equipment.
OECD 2015
Debt General government debt is the amount of a country’s total gross government debt. It is
an indicator of an economy’s budgetary health and a key factor for the sustainability of
government finance. Debt is commonly defined as a specific subset of liabilities identified
according to the types of financial instruments included or excluded. Debt is thus obtained
as the sum of the following liability categories (as applicable): currency and deposits;
securities other than shares, except financial derivatives; loans; insurance technical reserves;
and other accounts payable. Changes in government debt over time reflect the impact of
government deficits. This indicator is measured as a percentage of GDP. Data are under
System of National Accounts (SNA 1993) for all countries except for Australia and United
States (SNA 2008).
Studies by Pammolli et al. and Gerdtham et al. [1, 32] discuss the relation between debt
and public health expenditure and argue that countries with higher debt exhibit lower
level of public expenditure.
OECD 2015
GDP Gross domestic product is an aggregate measure of production equal to the sum of the
gross values added of all resident institutional units engaged in production (plus any taxes,
and minus any subsidies, on products not included in the value of their outputs). The sum of
the final uses of goods and services (all uses except intermediate consumption) measured in
purchasers’ prices, less the value of imports of goods and services, or the sum of primary
incomes distributed by resident producer units.
We have included this variable – supported by the literature on the determinants of health
expenditure [1–4] – to capture economic and societal determinants of health expenditure,
such as income and price developments, the spread of medical technologies and general
attitudes towards health care consumption.
OECD 2015
Population Population is defined as all nationals present in, or temporarily absent from a country, and
aliens permanently settled in a country. This indicator shows the number of people that
usually live in an area. Growth rates are the annual changes in population resulting from
births, deaths and net migration during the year. Total population includes the following:
national armed forces stationed abroad; merchant seamen at sea; diplomatic personnel
located abroad; civilian aliens resident in the country; displaced persons resident in the
country. However, it excludes the following: foreign armed forces stationed in the country;
foreign diplomatic personnel located in the country; civilian aliens temporarily in the
country. Population projections are a common demographic tool. They provide a basis for
other statistical projections, helping governments in their decision making. This indicator is
measured in thousands of people.
Ageing being an important driver for health expenditure, earlier versions of the draft
contained population over 65 (POP65) as the independent variable, producing equivalent
results in the regression.
OECD 2015
Deficit ratio This ratio expresses deficit in terms of GDP OECD
IMF bailout This dummy is modeled after Reeves et al. [6] and includes Stand-by Arrangements (SBA)
and Extended Fund Facilities (EFF):
IMF bailouts include Stand-by Arrangements, usually short-term lending to states to cover
the effect of unanticipated shocks, and Extended Fund Facilities, which are usually medium-
or long-term lending programs aimed at overcoming weaknesses in the national economy
which may have precipitated or exacerbated the shock.
IMF becomes 1 the year after the agreement has been made.
This reflects the time lag between the loan and the implementation of any changes to
government spending, i.e., if an agreement was made in 2008 the variable would measure 1
in 2009 and remain 1 while the bailout is active. When the agreement ends the indicator
becomes 0.
IMF’s Monitoring of Fund
Arrangements database (MONA)
FR This dummy variable indicates if a fiscal rule (ER, BBR, RR, DR) is present (1) or not (0) for a
given country, in a given year.
IMF 2016
ER This dummy variable indicates if an expenditure rule is present (1) or not (0), in a given year. IMF 2016
BBR This dummy variable indicates if a balanced budget rule is present (1) or not (0), in a given
year.
IMF 2016
BBR NAT This ordinal dummy variable indicates if a balanced budget rule at the national level is
present (1) or not (0), in a given year.
IMF 2016
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Table 4 Description of variables (Continued)
Variable Definition Data Source
BBR SUPRA This ordinal dummy variable indicates if a balanced budget rule at the supranational
level is present (1) or not (0), in a given year.
IMF 2016
BBR BOTH This ordinal dummy variable indicates if a balanced budget rule at both the national
and supranational level is present (1) or not (0), in a given year.
IMF 2016
DR This dummy variable indicates if a debt rule is present (1) or not (0), in a given year. IMF 2016
Table 5 Fiscal rules targeting public health care expenditure between 1985 and 2014
Country Expenditure Rule (ER) Balanced Budget
Rule (BBR) National
Balanced Budget
Rule (BBR) Supranational
Balanced Budget
Rule (BBR) Both
Australia 1985–1988
2009–2014
1985–1988
1998–2014
– –
Austriaa 2013-2014 – 1995-1998 1999–2014
Belgium 1993–1998 – 1992–2014 –
Canada 1998–2005 1998–2005 – –
Chile – 2001–2014 – –
Czech Republic – – 2004–2014 –
Denmark 1994–2014 – – 1992–2014
Estonia – 1993–2003 – 2004–2014
Finland 2003–2014 – 1995–1998 1999–2014
France 1998–2014 – 1992–2012 2013–2014
Germany 1985–2014 1985–1991 – 1992–2014
Greece 2010–2014 – 1992–2014 –
Hungary 2010–2011 – 2012–2014 2004–2011
Iceland 2004–2008 – – –
Ireland – – 1992–2014 –
Israel 2005–2014 1992–2014 – –
Italy – – 1992–2013 2014
Japan 2006–2008
2010–2014
1985–2014 – –
Luxembourg 1990–2014 – 1992–2014 –
Mexico – 2006–2014 – –
Netherlands 1994–2014 – 1992–2013 2014
New Zealand – 1994–2014 – –
Norway – 2001–2014 – –
Poland 2011–2014 – 2004–20052008–2014 2006–2007
Portugal – – 1992–2014 –
Slovak Republic – – 2004–2014 –
Slovenia – – 2004–2014 –
Spain 2011–2014 – 1992–2002 2003–2014
Sweden 1997–2014 – 1995–1999 2000–2014
Switzerlandb – – – –
United Kingdom – – 1992–1996 1997–2014
United Statesc 2011–2014 – – –
aModification of the original dataset; Austria introduced a budget cap in 2013, see [37]
bModification of the original dataset; the Swiss fiscal rules (introduced in 2003) cover only the relatively small federal budget and excludes health care
expenditure, see [38]
cModification of the original dataset; the 1985 and 1990 ER did not target Medicare or Medicaid spending. The 2011 ER did target Medicare
spendingSource: IMF 2015
Schakel et al. BMC Public Health  (2018) 18:300 Page 11 of 17
Appendix 3
Table 6 The association between fiscal rules and the level of public health care expenditure
Inflation adjusted government health care expenditure in log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All countries Exclude Cluster I countries
FR − 0.03** − 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01)
ER −0.04** − 0.05***
(0.01) (0.01)
BBR (detailed levels)
National −0.02
(0.02)
Supranational −0.06***
(0.02)
Both −0.08***
(0.02)
BBR −0.04** − 0.05***
(0.01) (0.01)
Log debt −0.03** −0.03* −0.03* − 0.03** −0.03* − 0.03* −0.03*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log GDP 0.75*** 0.71*** 0.83*** 0.77*** 0.68*** 0.62*** 0.70***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Log population 0.17 0.22 −0.08 0.13 0.13 0.19 0.08
(0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
IMF bailout −0.03 − 0.03 − 0.04 − 0.03 − 0.05* − 0.04 −0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant −12.80*** −12.41*** −11.31*** −12.58*** −10.60*** −9.95*** −10.26***
(1.64) (1.62) (1.71) (1.62) (1.73) (1.71) (1.71)
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 717 717 717 717 609 609 609
adj. R2 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997
Standard errors are in parentheses
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table 7 The lagged effectiveness of fiscal rules
Inflation adjusted government health care expenditure in log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lag: 1 year Lag: 2 years
FR −0.04*** −0.05***
(0.01) (0.01)
ER −0.05*** −0.06***
(0.01) (0.01)
BBR −0.04*** −0.05***
(0.01) (0.01)
Log debt −0.04** −0.03* − 0.04** − 0.04** −0.03** − 0.04**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log GDP 0.77*** 0.71*** 0.77*** 0.80*** 0.70*** 0.78***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Log population 0.14 0.22 0.11 0.10 0.23 0.08
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
IMF bailout −0.03 −0.03 −0.03 −0.02 −0.03 −0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant −12.82*** −12.35*** −12.43*** −12.77*** −12.22*** −12.24***
(1.62) (1.61) (1.62) (1.61) (1.60) (1.61)
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 717 717 717 717 717 717
adj. R2 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997
Standard errors are in parentheses
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table 8 Supporting procedures
Inflation adjusted government health care expenditure in log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ER BBR FR
FR 0.09 −0.03* −0.02 −0.03** −0.03*
(0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
FR×FR legal basis level 1 −0.17*** −0.06***
(0.04) (0.02)
FR×FR legal basis level 2 0.17 0.04*
(0.09) (0.02)
FR legal basis level 1 0.02
(0.07)
FR legal basis level 1 −0.29**
(0.10)
FR×ceiling − 0.05***
(0.01)
FR×independent body setting 0.01
(0.02)
FR×independent monitoring 0.06
(0.06)
Independent monitoring −0.07
(0.06)
Log GDP 0.73*** 0.75*** 0.75*** 0.75*** 0.76***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Log population 0.23 0.09 0.19 0.16 0.16
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Log debt −0.02 −0.02 −0.04** −0.03** −0.03**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Bailout −0.06* −0.03 − 0.04 −0.03 − 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant −12.95*** −11.32*** −12.86*** −12.35*** −12.39***
(2.02) (2.00) (2.00) (2.02) (2.02)
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
N 717 717 717 717 717
adj. R2 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table 9 The association between public healthcare spending as percentage of GDP (column 1) and various sensitivity checks
(columns 2–4)
Outcome
Public healthcare spending as % of GDP Log public healthcare spending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FR −0.40*** −0.03* −0.03*
(0.07) (0.01) (0.01)
Level of DR
National −0.03
(0.02)
Supranational −0.07***
(0.02)
both −0.07**
(0.02)
Log population −0.48 − 0.08 0.15
(0.61) (0.15) (0.12)
Log debt −0.17* −0.03* − 0.05***
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01)
Log GDP 0.83*** 0.77*** 0.81***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Ratio of population 65 and above 0.00
(0.00)
Deficit ratio −0.01***
(0.00)
IMF bailout − 0.09 −0.04 − 0.02 −0.06**
(0.12) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 16.41 −10.53*** −9.83*** −14.35***
(10.47) (2.06) (1.44) (1.89)
Country FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
N 717 717 735 631
This table presents a series of robustness checks we performed by using similar measures to replace our main model. Column 1 changes the outcome variable
from inflation and PPP adjusted public healthcare spending to such spending as a percentage of total GDP. Column 2 replaces the primary variable of interest
from general FR to DR. Columns 3 and 4 replaces population and debt with ratio of population 65 and above and deficit ratio
Standard errors in parentheses *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Abbreviations
BBR: Balanced budget rule; DR: Debt rule; ER: Expenditure rule; FR: Fiscal rule;
GDP: Gross domestic product; IMF: International monetary fund;
OECD: Organisation for economic co-operation and development;
SGP: Stability and growth pact
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